Deterministic addresses

How Sail achieves identical core addresses across chains, and identical SMA addresses across chains — with the exact formulas from SailKernel.createAccount.

Core salts

Each core contract is deployed through the standard CREATE2 factory (0x4e59b44847b379578588920cA78FbF26c0B4956C) with a chain-independent salt and identical constructor arguments:

Contract	Salt
TimelockController	keccak256("sail.timelock.v1")
SailGovernance	keccak256("sail.governance.v1")
SailKernel	keccak256("sail.kernel.v1")
MandateFactory	keccak256("sail.mandatefactory.v1")
StandardFeePolicy	keccak256("sail.feepolicy.v1")
SafeModuleEnabler	keccak256("sail.modulenabler.v1")

A CREATE2 address is keccak256(0xff ++ factory ++ salt ++ keccak256(initCode))[12:]. Since the factory and salt are identical everywhere, the address is identical iff the init code (constructor args included) is identical. Injecting the timelock into SailGovernance (rather than constructing it inline) is what makes every constructor argument chain-independent.

SMA address binding

When the kernel creates an account it derives the Safe's CREATE2 salt by binding the caller's nonce to the principals:

boundSalt = uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(
    saltNonce, msg.sender, permissionSigner, manager, feePolicy
)));

It then predicts the Safe proxy address with the exact formula the Safe v1.4.1 SafeProxyFactory uses, so an already-deployed proxy at that address is adopted rather than re-deployed:

// create2Salt = keccak256(keccak256(initializer), boundSalt)
bytes32 create2Salt = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(keccak256(safeInitializer), boundSalt));

// initCodeHash = keccak256(proxyCreationCode ++ uint256(uint160(singleton)))
bytes32 initCodeHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
    ISafeFactory(safeFactory).proxyCreationCode(),
    uint256(uint160(safeSingleton))
));

address predicted = address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
    bytes1(0xff), safeFactory, create2Salt, initCodeHash
)))));

Because the safeInitializer references only chain-identical contracts (the kernel and the SafeModuleEnabler), the same (owner, permissionSigner, manager, feePolicy, saltNonce) yields the same SMA address on every supported chain.

Front-run resistance

Binding the principals into boundSalt means a deployment supplying a different permissionSigner or manager lands at a different address. An attacker therefore cannot register your counterfactual address with their principals — the address itself is a commitment to the principals (Octane #4 / #16).

Predicting off-chain

To compute an SMA address before deployment, reproduce the two-step derivation above with your chosen saltNonce and principals and the canonical Safe v1.4.1 factory/singleton from addresses. The Sailor SDK exposes this as account predict; at the protocol level, mirror the Solidity above. You can fund the predicted address before the Safe exists on a given chain.