Dispatch a transaction within bounds

With the SMA registered and at least one permission attached, the manager can execute calls. Each dispatch names the one permission that should authorize it.

1. Build the Dispatch signature

The selective-model type string (note the permission field):

Dispatch(address account,address permission,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)

Sign with the manager key:

dataHash  = keccak256(data)                  // the call's calldata
structHash = keccak256(abi.encode(
    DISPATCH_TYPEHASH,
    account, permission, target, value, dataHash,
    managerNonces[account],                   // read from the kernel
    deadline
))
digest    = kernel.hashTypedDataV4(structHash)
managerSig = sign(digest, managerKey)         // ECDSA or ERC-1271

Read the nonce from kernel.managerNonces(account).

2. Submit

kernel.dispatch(account, permission, target, value, data, managerSig, deadline);

The kernel verifies the signature, staticcalls permission.evaluate(data, ctx) under the 150k gas cap, and — only if it returns true — executes execTransactionFromModule(target, value, data, 0) on the Safe. On success it emits Dispatched(account, permission, target, selector, value).

What a denial looks like

The dispatch reverts (no state change) in these cases:

Revert	Cause
PermissionNotRegistered(permission)	you named a permission that isn't on the account's mandate
PermissionDenied(permission)	the permission returned false, reverted, ran out of gas, or returned malformed data
SessionInactive(account)	the session is paused (revokeSession was called)
DeadlineExpired(deadline, now)	block.timestamp > deadline
InvalidManagerSignature()	the signature didn't recover to the account's manager
AccountSelfTarget()	target == account (blocked — would let the Safe reconfigure itself)
SafeExecutionFailed()	the permission approved it but the Safe call itself failed
ProtocolPaused()	the protocol is paused

Because evaluation is fail-closed, a buggy permission denies rather than over-permits. If you hit PermissionDenied, re-check the permission's bounds against your call — it's doing its job.

Nonces and in-flight invalidation

Each successful dispatch increments managerNonces[account]. If the Permission Signer revokes a permission, revokes the session, replaces a permission, or the Safe rotates the manager, the kernel bumps the manager-nonce epoch (1 << 128), which invalidates every dispatch the manager had pre-signed but not yet submitted. This means tightening the mandate cannot be raced by a stale signature.

Batches

For an atomic multi-call sequence (e.g. approve → call → reset), use dispatchBatch with a batch-aware permission. The signature is over DispatchBatch(account, permission, callsHash, nonce, deadline) with callsHash = keccak256(abi.encode(calls)), using the separate batchNonces. You can pre-check a batch off-chain with previewBatch(account, permission, calls). See single & batch dispatch.